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LEGAL ANALYSIS: DAESH CONTROL OF
WATERCOURSES IN SYRIA AND IRAQ
Nadim Damluji †
Abstract:
After years of turmoil, the volatile situation in Iraq and Syria
erupted into chaos, setting the stage for the rise of Daesh. Under the leadership of Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi since 2013, Daesh has successfully gained control of territory and
influence throughout vast regions of Iraq and Syria to create a new religious caliphate. 1
In the water-scarce region, Daesh has executed a plan to capture the most precious
resource available: water. The critical threat Daesh poses to watercourse installations
along the Tigris and Euphrates in Syria and Iraq poses a pressing challenge to water
security in the Middle East. How might state actors hold Daesh accountable for their
control, depletion, and weaponization of the public resource of water? In the midst of
multi-ethnic sectarian conflicts, what national laws in Iraq and Syria create obligations
for a coordinated federal response to protect their watercourses? What duties does an
Armed Non-State Actor owe within a positivist international legal system? Do those
duties change when that actor draws new borders for a new self-proclaimed “state” made
up of transnational sovereign territory?
This note will examine the legal implications that are triggered by Daesh control
over watercourses throughout Iraq and Syria. Part I contextualizes the threat Daesh poses
to watercourses in Iraq and Syria as well as what type of legal personhood they possess.
Part II examines the legal obligations of state actors under domestic, Islamic, and
international law with respect to Daesh control of water installations in Iraq and Syria.
After establishing the legal basis, Part III analyzes the extent to which Daesh, as an
Armed Non-State Actor, can be legally bound under the same sources of law. Part IV
applies the sources of law identified in Parts II and III to two case studies of Daesh
control and explores mechanisms for enforcing these theories of accountability.

I.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Threat Daesh Poses to Watercourses in Iraq and Syria

The Twin Rivers of the Tigris and Euphrates originate in Turkey and
flow south into Syria and Iraq. 2 Both Syria and Iraq are dependent on
†
J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, 2016. B.A., Politics with honors,
Whitman College, 2010. I am thankful to Professor Frederick Lorenz for his support and guidance in
shaping this article and to Zachary Parsons and the staff of the Washington International Law Journal for
their skillful editorial guidance. I am ever grateful to my parents, Gina and Namir Damluji, for fortifying
me with enough confidence and love to pursue a legal education. To Richard and Elvis Devenport, for
their dogged friendship throughout that education. Finally, I wrote this article in honor of the rich history
of Iraq, a homeland to which I have never been but will one day return.
1
Graeme
Wood,
What
ISIS Really
Wants,
THE ATLANTIC (March 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/ magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ (Daesh “already
rules an area larger than the United Kingdom”).
2
Bülent Açma, Water Security in the Middle East: A Case Study of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers,
in WATER POLICY AND LAW IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: AN EVOLVING NEXUS 90 (Slavko Bogdan ed., 2011).
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installations along the Tigris and Euphrates to provide drinking water,
electricity, and irrigation to their citizens.3 Prior to the rise of Daesh, also
referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), in the region,
issues related to water access throughout Syria and Iraq had already
developed into a crisis.4 The regional water crisis stems from a longstanding
reliance on critical installations that fall short of standards for efficiency and
structural integrity. 5 Along the Tigris, key installations include the Badush
Dam, Mosul Dam, and the Samarra Barrage in Iraq.6 Along the Euphrates,
key installations include the Baath Dam and the Tabqa Dam in Syria and the
Fallujah Barrage Dam and the Haditha Dam in Iraq. 7 The long-term decline
in water quantity and quality in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin—a direct result
of water diversions in Turkey—also contributed to the water crisis.8
Daesh has a well-documented strategy based on controlling territory
along the watercourses and controlling their related installations. In early
2013, Daesh captured the Tabqa Dam. This Euphrates installation is a
source of water and electricity for five million people, including residents of
Aleppo, Syria’s largest city. 9 Under Daesh control, the Tabqa’s reservoir,
3
Lindsay Church, Water Security and the Islamic State: Challenges and Opportunities for the
International Community 4 (2015) (unpublished policy analysis, University of Washington, Jackson School
of International Studies, Middle East Center).
4
Sharmila L. Murthy, Iraq’s Constitutional Mandate to Justly Distribute Water: The Implications
of Federalism, Islam, International Law and Human Rights, 42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 749, 749–51
(2010) (writing of Iraq in 2011: “In Baghdad, Iraq’s most populous city, 25% of the population remains
disconnected from the water supply network; residents are forced to rely on expensive and unreliable
alternative sources of drinking water. Outside of Baghdad, more than 30% of the population does not have
access to potable water service delivery, and in rural areas, this figure rises to over 50%. Many Iraqis
spend one-third of their income on purchasing potable water.”). See also Joshua Hammer, Is a Lack of
Water to Blame for the Conflict in Syria?, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (June 2013),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/is-a-lack-of-water-to-blame-for-the-conflict-in-syria-7251
3729/?no-ist (the Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment documented that between 2003 and 2009 in
Tigris-Euphrates Basin, “117 million acre-feet of stored freshwater vanished from the region as a result of
dwindling rainfall and poor water management policies,” an amount “equal to all the water in the Dead
Sea.” In Syria a 2006 drought forced many farmers to “abandon their field and migrate to urban centers.”).
5
FREDERICK LORENZ & EDWARD J. ERICKSON, STRATEGIC WATER: IRAQ AND SECURITY PLANNING
IN THE EUPHRATES-T IGRIS BASIN 103–25 (Shawn Vreeland ed., 1st ed. 2013). See also id. at 109 (“On 4
June 2002, a major Syrian dam collapsed; even though it was not widely reported, this event raised
questions about Syria and the management of its water resources. Although not within the EuphratesTigris basin, the Zeyzoun Dam’s rupture and collapse brought to light immediate concerns of dam safety
and maintenance in Syria.”); id. at 125 (“In 2010 the Mosul Dam continued to require a half million dollars
per year to repair cracks that threaten its integrity and reduce its effective hydropower potential.”).
6
Church, supra note 3, at 4.
7
Id.
8
LORENZ & ERICKSON, supra note 5, at 4–5.
9
Fred Pearce, Mideast Water Wars: In Iraq, A Battle for Control of Water, YALE ENVIRONMENT
360 2 (Aug. 25, 2014), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/mideast_water_wars_in_iraq_a_battle_for_control_of_
water/2796/.

APRIL 2016

DAESH CONTROL OF WATERCOURSES IN SYRIA AND IRAQ

333

Lake Assad, was dramatically reduced in size, causing blackouts in Aleppo
for sixteen to twenty hours a day on average. 10
In April 2014, Daesh seized control of the Fallujah Dam in Iraq and
intentionally released water into the local community. This act destroyed
160 kilometers of downstream cropland and deprived millions of people
access to water in downstream cities such as Karbala, Najaf, and Babil.11
The intent behind the water release was to “use water aggressively as a tool
of destruction, targeting populations who live farther south.”12
More recently, Daesh launched repeated attacks to gain control of the
Haditha Dam, the second largest dam in Iraq, which was built along the
Euphrates and is located considerably upstream in Al Anbar Provence. It
serves as the major source of agricultural irrigation and generates one-third
of the country’s electricity. 13 Government officials in Iraq were so
concerned with Daesh control of the Haditha Dam that they told workers to
be prepared to open the floodgates against Daesh forces rather than
relinquish control. 14 Similar concerns exist for the Mosul Dam, Iraq’s
largest dam, which Daesh briefly controlled from August 7 to 18, 2014.15
Daesh was met with little resistance until President Obama authorized two
days of concerted airstrikes around the dam. 16 The coordinated airstrikes
gave hundreds of Kurdish peshmerga fighters and Iraqi forces the ability to
reclaim the Mosul Dam. 17
Daesh has greatly mismanaged and severely limited the public’s
access to the watercourse installations under their control. Furthermore,
Daesh has demonstrated an intent to weaponize the watercourses based on
severely misinterpreted religious thoughts. Based on its behavior, continued
Daesh control of watercourses and related installations along the Tigris and
10

Id.
Nadia Massih, ISIS Gains Highlight “Aggressive” Use of Water as Weapon of War, THE DAILY
STAR (July 21, 2014), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Jul-21/264554-isis-gainshighlight-aggressive -use-of-water-as-weapon-of-war.ashx#sthash.9N7f9pWs.dpuf.
12
Id. (quoting Russell Sticklor, co-author of Water Challenges and Cooperative Response in the
Middle East and North Africa).
13
Pearce, supra note 9, at 3.
14
Alissa J. Rubin & Rob Nordland, Sunni Militants Advance Toward Large Iraqi Dam, N.Y. TIMES
(June 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/world/middleeast/isis-iraq.html.
15
Azem Ahmed, In Retaking of Iraqi Dam, Evidence of American Impact, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/world/middleeast/in-retaking-of-iraqi-dam-evidence-of-ameri
can-impact.html.
16
Id.
17
Id.
11
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Euphrates raises grim possibilities. Daesh may destroy dams, use dams to
manipulate power grids, reduce water flow from dams to deprive
downstream populations of water, use water as a weapon against
downstream cities, and use water to overtake larger swaths of territory.18
B.

Classifying Daesh as a Legal Actor

Control and utilization of watercourses and installations in these
regions is governed by a combination of domestic law, Islamic Law, and
international law. However, any application of these sources of law is
complicated by Daesh’s status as an Armed Non-State Actor (ANSA). 19
ANSAs are “any armed group, distinct from and not operating under the
control of the State or States in which it carries out military operations, and
which has political, religious, or military objectives.” 20 International law
has historically viewed states as the only relevant actors in international
conflicts. 21 ANSAs are increasingly a political reality in international
conflicts and, thus, disrupt this longstanding state-centric approach.
Therefore, the definitive duties that accompany the legal classification of
ANSAs are not fully developed. The issue of how to create legal obligations
for ANSAs will be discussed at length later in this note. 22 Given the
relatively recent emergence of ANSAs, an analysis of legal obligations
presents all the challenges inherent to a lack of precedent for legal standing,
case law, and practical means of enforcing duties beyond a theoretical
perspective. Yet, given the threat posed by Daesh, such analysis is urgently
needed and cannot wait for a fully-developed regime to impose legal
obligations.
II.

LEGAL OBLIGATIONS GOVERNING WATERCOURSES AND
INSTALLATIONS

This Part examines the legal obligations of state actors with respect to
Daesh’s control of water installations in Iraq and Syria under domestic,
18

See Church, supra note 3, at 5–12.
Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca & Stuart Casey-Maslen, International Law and Armed Non-State
Actors in Afghanistan, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 47, 48 (2011) [hereinafter Bellal et al., ANSAs in
Afghanistan].
20
Annyssa Bellal & Stuart Casey-Maslen, Enhancing Compliance with International Law by Armed
Non-State Actors, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 175, 176 n.2 (2011) [hereinafter Bellal & Casey-Maslen,
Enhancing Compliance].
21
Frederick M. Lorenz, The Protection of Water Facilities under International Law, UNESCO-IHP
18, 46 (2003).
22
See Infra Part III.
19
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Islamic, and international law. First, under domestic law, Iraq and Syria
have an obligation to ensure that watercourses remain a public good and
that they are justly distributed. Second, under Islamic Law, the Qur’an and
hadith literature mandate both that all Muslims should have equal access to
water and that water should be used in moderation because it is a finite
resource. Third, under international law, the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses of
1997 (U.N. Watercourses Convention or UNWC) creates obligations for
Iraq and Syria to protect watercourses and the related installations in their
territory from harm, emergency situations, and armed conflict. The U.N.
Watercourses Convention further brings in a series of International
Humanitarian Law provisions for times of armed conflict.
A.

Obligations Under Iraqi and Syrian Domestic Law

Although Syria and Iraq face massive threats to sovereignty and
internal security, any legal analysis should first look to the fundamental
obligations of the current regimes. To analyze the obligations created for the
state actors of Iraq and Syria, this Part will examine the Iraqi Constitution
and Syrian laws pertaining to water management.
1.

Legal Framework for Water Management in Iraq

In 2005, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) drafted and approved an
Interim Constitution that has subsequently become permanent.23 The Iraqi
Constitution divides power between federal, regional, governorate, and local
governments. 24 Although it broadly outlines the obligations of these
different powers, some critics note that it leaves many structural and
procedural issues unresolved. 25
The Iraqi Constitution creates several obligations for the state to
respond to potential Daesh control of watercourse installations. First, in
Articles 7 and 9, the Constitution contains provisions that establish the
obligation for the government to combat Daesh as an ANSA. Second, in
Articles 110 and 114, the Constitution mandates that federal and local
23

Iraq Index, INT’L CONST. L., http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/iz__indx.html (last visited Feb. 28,

2016).
24

See 'XVWǌU-XPতǌUƯ\DWDO-ދ,UƗT>7KH&RQVWLWXWLRQRIWKH5HSXEOLFRI,UDT@RI
William S. Spencer et al., Next Steps for Implementing The Iraq Constitution, PUB. INT’L L. &
POL’Y GROUP 1, 38 (2006).
25
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governments ensure the “just distribution” of water flow to all individuals in
accordance with international law and conventions.
a.

Iraq’s Provisions Prohibiting the Existence of Daesh

The drafters of the new Iraqi Constitution were mindful of the
political reality of multi-ethnic sectarianism within the state. As such, the
Constitution creates an explicit framework that prohibits the presence of
groups such as Daesh and assigns the state an affirmative duty to combat
them. Under Articles 7 and 9 of the Iraqi Constitution, Daesh should be
considered unconstitutional and the state has an affirmative obligation to
combat it.
Article 7, Second of the Constitution mandates that “the State shall
undertake to combat terrorism in all its forms, and shall work to protect its
territories from being a base, pathway, or field for terrorist activities.” 26 The
legislative history of Article 7 contains a very heated discussion of how to
outlaw association with the Saddam Hussein-led Ba’ath party. 27 Paragraph
One of the provision went through many drafts and ultimately settled on
language that outlaws “any entity or program that adopts, incites, facilitates,
glorifies, promotes, or justifies racism or terrorism or accusations of being
an infidel or ethnic cleansing.”28 The provision continues to list the Saddam
Ba’athists as an exemplar of such activity, yet retains a broad categorization
that would include Daesh.29 Article 7, Second also declares that the State
shall combat groups that fit under the Paragraph One categorization. Article
7, Second accordingly creates a legal obligation for the State to actively
combat Daesh in order to “protect its territories” from “terrorist activity.”
Article 9 of the Constitution provides for the creation of the Iraqi
armed forces and security services while also prohibiting “the formation of
military militias outside the framework of the armed forces.”30 Daesh is a
military militia outside of the framework of the armed forces authorized by

26

Article 7, Section 2, 'XVWǌU-XPতǌUƯ\DWDO-ދ,UƗT [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
Ashley Deeks & Matthew Burton, Iraq's Constitution: A Drafting History, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
1, 13 (2007).
28
Id. (citing Article 7, Section 2 'XVWǌU -XPতǌUƯ\DW DO-ދ,UƗT [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005).
29
Id.
30
Article 9, Section 1, B, 'XVWǌU-XPতǌUƯ\DWDO-ދ,UƗT [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of
2005.
27
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Article 9, which must be exclusively created and regulated by the Iraqi
Government. Daesh is therefore an illegal entity under Article 9.31
Article 7, First and Article 9, First, B of the Constitution define the
presence of Daesh in Iraq as illegal. Furthermore, Article 7, Second also
establishes an affirmative State obligation to “combat” Daesh. Although
“combat” is not further defined in the text, it would include the current
activities of the Iraqi State and provide the legal basis for the action. This
might be considered analogous to the authority granted by the proposed
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against Daesh by the
United States. 32
b.

Iraqi Constitutional Obligations Pertaining to Water Resource
Management

Articles 110 and 114 of the Iraqi Constitution expressly create powers
for the federal government and regional authorities to maintain and protect
the just distribution of water resources. Daesh seizure and control of
watercourses triggers these obligations.
Article 110 lists the exclusive powers and obligations of the federal
government. One of those exclusive duties is “[p]lanning policies relating to
water sources from outside Iraq and guaranteeing the rate of water flow to
Iraq and its just distribution inside Iraq in accordance with international laws
and conventions.” 33 The article thus obliges the federal authorities to
prevent Daesh control of watercourse installations and imposes limitations
and obligations as defined by international law.
First, as described in the introduction, Daesh control of the water
installations in Iraq poses a direct threat to Iraqi citizens who rely on the
watercourses for drinking water, electricity, and irrigation. Article 110,
Eighth safeguards access to water as a universal right against the sectarian
bias of political parties that created the Iraqi Constitution. Second, federal
31

Militia is defined as “a military force that engages in rebel or terrorist activities, typically in
opposition to a regular army.” Militia, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/
definition/american_english/ militia?searchDictCode=all (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).,
32
Letter from President Barack Obama to Congress, Authorization for the Use of United States
Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Feb. 11, 2015),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/11/letter-president-authorization-use-united-statesarmed-forces-connection.
33
Article 110, Section 8, 'XVWǌU -XPতǌUƯ\DW DO-ދ,UƗT [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of
2005 (emphasis added).
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regulation is subject to international laws and conventions. 34 The legislative
history shows that the guarantee of water access according to international
laws and conventions was maintained throughout multiple draft forms of the
Constitution. 35 These international standards will be discussed more
thoroughly in the subsequent discussion of the U.N. Watercourses
Convention, to which Iraq has acceded. 36
Article 114 outlines the powers and obligations shared between the
federal government and regional authorities. Article 114, Seventh declares
that one of the shared duties is “[t]o formulate and regulate the internal water
resources policy in a way that guarantees their just distribution, and this shall
be regulated by law.” Here, the importance of “just distribution” is again
emphasized. However, Article 114 is ambiguous as to whether assuring
distribution is an exclusive power of the federal government or whether it
must be carried out in concert with the regional authorities. 37 A Public
International Law and Policy Group Roundtable argued that the inclusion of
policy pertaining to water rights as both an exclusive duty and shared duty
would likely require a constitutional amendment or legislation clarifying
which branch should maintain control over this right. 38 Without such
amendment, the duty to protect watercourses from Daesh control most likely
rests with the federal government. Article 110 specifies that watercourses
originating from outside the country fall in the exclusive powers of the
federal government, which would apply to both the Tigris and the Euphrates.
Articles 110 and 114 create the obligation for the federal government
to maintain “just distribution” of water inside Iraq. Daesh seizure and
control of watercourse installations, such as the Fallujah Dam, which
flooded thousands of homes and farmland, has proven that their distribution
of water would not be just. Therefore, under either Article, the federal
government is obliged to respond to Daesh control of the watercourses.
Moreover, Daesh violates the Iraqi Constitution in its mission to establish
dominion over the watercourses.
34

Deeks & Burton, supra note 27, at 24–25.
Id. at 24–25. Draft version from Aug. 23, 2005: “plan policies relating to water sources from
outside Iraq and guarantee [the] rate of water flow to Iraq in accordance with laws and international
convention.”
36
See infra Part II.C.
37
Murthy, supra note 4, at 12 (acknowledging this ambiguity and arguing, “a more likely
interpretation is that under Article 114, the federal and regional governments exercise concurrent, but
independent, powers.”).
38
Spencer et al., supra note 25, at 40.
35
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Legal Framework of Water Management Under Syrian Law

In Syria, the legal framework for water management stems from the
Mejelle, the French Mandate, and more recently, Articles 1234 to 1328.39
Under these sources of domestic law, watercourses are mandated to be a
public good. The Syrian Constitution does not contain any specific
provisions about water management. However, the Introduction and Article
114 of the Syrian Constitution establish general legal obligations for the
state that are implicated by the threat of Daesh control of watercourses.
a.

Syria’s Constitutional Obligations Related to Daesh

The most recent Syrian Constitution was passed in 2012 by the Assad
government in response to the widespread uprisings that began in 2011.40 In
its current form, the Constitution has no explicit provisions addressing water
management. The Constitution does contain several provisions pertaining to
obligations to address the threat of Daesh control of watercourses more
generally, specifically in the Introduction and Article 114.
The Introduction to the Syrian Constitution reads: “Abiding by
righteousness, justice, and international law, the Syrian Arab Republic aims
to achieve and maintain peace and international security, both of which it
considers to be key objectives.”41 This language defers to international law
in achieving both “peace” and “international security.” Daesh control of
water installations would obstruct these objectives.
Therefore, the
government is obliged to abide by “justice” and “international law” in
addressing the threat of Daesh.
Chapter 2, Article 114 of the Constitution provides, “[i]n case of
grave danger which threatens national unity or the safety and independence
of the homeland . . . the President may take quick action required by the
circumstances to face the danger.”42 Here, the Constitution unequivocally
gives power to the President to address any threat to state institutions that
might arise. Partially enacted in response to the uprisings in Syria, this
39
Raya Marina Stephan, Legal Framework for Groundwater Management in the Middle East, in
WATER RESOURCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ISRAEL-PALESTINE WATER ISSUES—FROM CONFLICT TO
COOPERATION 293, 294 (Hillel Shuval & Hassan Dweik eds., 2007).
40
DUSTUR JUMHURIYYA AL ‘ARABIYYA AL-SURIYYA [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 24, 2012, Introduction
(Syria).
41
Id.
42
Id., art. 114.
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provision couches presidential authority in broad terms to allow the
Executive constitutional leeway in responding to “grave danger.” As it
stands, this provision gives the President the authority to coordinate a
response to Daesh threat to national security.
Although the central government does not currently control the
territory held by Daesh, we must assume that the situation will eventually
change. It is essential to plan now for the accountability of Daesh for
serious violations of the law.
b.

Syrian Water Law Under the Mejelle, the French Mandate, and Act
No. 31

The legal framework for management of watercourses in Syria
primarily stems from the Mejelle, which codified Islamic Law during the
Ottoman Empire and remained in force even after Syria achieved
independence. 43 Article 1234 defines water as a common good, 44 and
Article 1235 mandates that water is not the absolute property of any
person. 45 Outside of the Mejelle, two texts inherited from the French
Mandate govern Syria’s water management.46 First, Order No. 144/S of the
High Commissioner, passed on June 10, 1925, defines the public domain as
“all things which are by definition affected to the use of all or to a public
service. It is alienable and imprescriptible.” 47 Second, Order No. 320,
passed on May 26, 1926, governs the conservation and use of watercourses
in the public domain. 48
These texts serve as the foundation for water legislation in Syria and
were supplemented with Act No. 31 of November 16th passed in 2005. Act
No. 31 “sets forth that watercourses, lakes, waterfalls, springs, and
groundwater are deemed to be a public good.”49 Act No. 31 further provides
that watercourses should be protected from depletion. 50 Most notably, it
43

Stephan, supra note 39, at 294.
Id.
45
Léna Salamé & Rana Karouf-Gaudig, Water Law in East Mediterranean Countries: The
Imperative of a Holistic Approach, in WATER POLICY AND LAW IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: AN EVOLVING
NEXUS 1, 5 (Slavko Bogdan ed., 2011).
46
Stephan, supra note 39, at 3.
47
Id. (quoting Order No. 144/S of the High Commissioner, June 10, 1925).
48
Id.
49
Salamé & Karouf-Gaudig, supra note 45, at 5 (quoting Water Legislation Act., SYRIAN OFFICIAL
GAZETTE, No. 31 of November 16, 2006).
50
Id. at 10.
44
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mandates that all extraction projects be subject to prior authorization.51 If
the Act is violated, “serious penalties are provided for under criminal law.”52
Daesh has violated this provision, but for now, as in Iraq, the main obstacle
for applying criminal law is that the Syrian government lacks enforcement
capability.
Under the Mejelle, the French Mandate orders, and Act No. 31, water
is to be treated as a public resource that is to be managed by the government.
Contrary uses are therefore illegal and the Syrian government thereby has
the legal obligation to keep watercourses public. Daesh forces are in
violation of these sources of law as demonstrated by their intended seizure,
control, and private use of watercourses and related installations in Syria.
B.

Obligations to Protect Watercourses Under Islamic Law

Islamic Law, or Sharia Law, creates a series of principles for water
management that assert access to water as a universal right. Iraq and Syria
have constitutional provisions that mandate Sharia as a source of legislation.
In other words, all laws in Syria and Iraq must not contradict Islamic Law.
Islamic Law is primarily derived from two sources: the Qur’an and hadith
literature. Islamic Law, as derived from the Qur’an and hadith literature,
dictates that access to water is a universal right.
1.

Sharia as Source of Law in the Iraqi and Syrian Constitutions

Since 1950, the majority of Arab countries have enacted constitutions
with provisions that mandate that Islamic norms are a controlling source of
legislation. 53 In countries such as Kuwait, Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, United
Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain, constitutions contain what Clark
Lombardi, a scholar of Islamic Law, refers to as “sharia-as-source-oflegislation” provisions (SSL). These are provisions that make Islamic norms
“a” or “the” chief source of legislation.54 SSL provisions are apparent in
both the Syrian and Iraqi Constitutions.

51

Id.
Salamé & Karouf-Gaudig, supra note 45, at 11 (quoting Water Legislation Act., SYRIAN OFFICIAL
GAZETTE, No. 31 of November 16, 2006).
53
Clark Lombardi, Constitutional Provisions Making Sharia “A” or “The” Chief Source of
Legislation: Where Did They Come From? What Do They Mean? Do They Matter?, 28 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 733, 734 (2013) [hereinafter Lombardi, Constitutional Provisions].
54
Id.
52
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The 1950 Syrian constitutional declaration, Article 2, states: “Islamic
fiqh [traditional scholarly interpretations of Islamic law] shall be the chief
source of legislation.” 55 In 1973, Syria enacted a new constitution that
changed the language to make Islamic fiqh “a chief source of legislation.”56
This same clause remains in the current constitution, which the Assad
government passed in 2012.57 Article 2, First of the Iraqi Constitution reads,
“Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of
legislation,” and further mandates that “[n]o law may be enacted that
contradicts the established provisions of Islam.” 58 Under the assumption
that adherence to Islamic Law could be inconsistent with human rights
values, Lombardi points out, “the U.S. government in 2004 worked hard to
prevent the government of occupied Iraq from drafting a constitution that
made Islam ‘the chief source’ of legislation.” 59
The SSL provisions in the Syrian and Iraqi Constitutions make Sharia
“a” source of legislation in both contexts. While this requires that laws
respect Sharia norms, the provisions hold a more symbolic role for
lawmaking than if Islamic Law had been defined as “the” only source of
legislation. 60 Even if applying the stricter standard of Sharia being “the”
only source of legislation, the domestic water legislation previously
examined in both states would harmonize with principles of Islamic Law.
This is because the sources of Islamic Law, the Qur’anic text and hadith
principles, confirm the obligation of the state to guarantee access to water as
a universal right.
2.

Laws Derived from Qur’anic Text

Qur’anic scripture is the primary source of Islamic Law. 61 In Islam,
the Qur’an is believed to be the direct transmission from God. As such, any
passages that contain goals that are unambiguous and whose meaning is
55

Id. at 737 (citing AL-DUSTURAL-SURI [CONSTITUTION] Sept. 5, 1950 (Syria)).
Id. at 745.
57
Id.
58
Article 2, Section 1, 'XVWǌU-XPতǌUƯ\DWDO-ދ,UƗT [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
59
Lombardi, Constitutional Provisions, supra note 53, at 735 (citing Gihane Tabet, Women in
Personal Status Laws: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, UNESCO SHS, at 10 (SHS Papers in
Women's Studies/Gender Research Paper Series 10 No. 4, 2005)) (quoting Paul Bremer, U.S. Transitional
Administrator to Iraq, as saying “Islam is the official religion of the Iraqi State and one of the sources of
law,” and further insisting he would “veto any draft constitution for an independent Iraq that made Islam
the chief or principle source of legislation.”).
60
Id. at 773.
61
CLARK LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT 21 (2006) [hereinafter
LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW].
56
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absolutely certain are considered binding to all Muslims. 62 The Qur’an
contains about 500 verses with legal content, several of which refer to access
to natural resources. 63 Water in particular holds tremendous religious
significance for Muslims for the part it plays in ablution and bathing. 64
Indeed, the Qur’anic scripture mentions water sixty-three times. 65
In general, the Qur’an presents a central tenant that God entrusts
humans with “the stewardship of the earth.” 66 The Qur’an emphasizes the
common good, deeming it inappropriate “for one person to despoil what has
been provided by the Creator for the use and enjoyment of all.” 67 In verses
such as 13:8, 15:21, and 25:2, the Qur’an obligates man to maintain natural
systems. 68 To that end, Muslims are held accountable for any acts of
destruction committed against the earth. 69 The Qur’an regards water as
common property and, as such, requires the protection and regulation of
watercourses as a central dictum. 70
The Qur’an has two definite principles regulating water management:
the supply of water is fixed (Chapter 23: Verse 18) and water should not be
wasted (Chapter 7: Verse 31).71 The Qur’an views water as an exhaustible
resource that humans must manage responsibly. 72 These principles show
that in the Qur’an, water is defined as a public commodity. Such a reading
supports current classifications and management of watercourses in the Iraqi
Constitution as well as in Syrian legislation. In light of this understanding,
any maneuver by Daesh to alter access to the natural watercourses and
related installations violates the Qur’anic decree that they should remain
public goods

62

Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 22.
64
Laura Wickström, Islam and Water: Islamic Guiding Principles on Water Management, 25
FINNISH INST. INT’L AFF. 98, 99 (2010).
65
Id.
66
Lisa Wersal, Islam and Environmental Ethics: Tradition Responds to Contemporary Challenges,
30(3) ZYGON 451, 452 (1995).
67
Id. at 453.
68
Wickström, supra note 64, at 99. See also THE QUR’AN 13:8, 15:21, 25:2.
69
Wickström, supra note 64, at 100; THE QUR’AN, SURRAS 2:205, 7:85
70
Richard Foltz, Ecology and Religion: Ecology and Islam 2651–54 (2005); The Qur’an, Surras,
54:28.
71
Wickström, supra note 64, at 100; THE QUR’AN 23:18, 7:31.
72
Id.
63
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Laws Derived from Hadith Literature

Hadith literature is the secondary source of Islamic Law.73 The hadith
reports the events in the life of the Prophet Mohammad and his companions,
which set an example of how to interpret the words of the Qur’an into laws
and practice.74 The Prophet Mohammad, through hadith literature, supports
the view of universal access to water and the duty to protect it.
The Prophet Mohammad prohibits Muslims from wasting water. The
hadith quoted Abu-Dawood 3470 as saying: “Muslims have a common share
in three things: grass (pasture), water, and fire (fuel).” 75 Throughout the
hadith, Muslim scholars have found that the Prophet Mohammad annexed
penalties for water misusage, including polluting clean water. 76 One clear
hadith passage on point can be found in al-Tirmidhi 427 in regards to
ablution (the act of washing oneself), wherein the Prophet Mohammad
showed that “water was not to be wasted even when the ablution was
performed on the bank of a fast-flowing (large) river.”77
The hadith passages here show that the value of water as a communal
property is important to interpreting the Qur’an’s message. Domestic law in
Syria and Iraq values that distinction, consistently maintaining that
watercourses should be managed in a manner that gives just distribution to
all in the territory. The same holds true for international law on water as
codified by the U.N. Watercourses Convention, which will be discussed in
the next section. Laura Wickström argues that the principles of water
management created in the Qur’an and hadith are in accordance with the
U.N. Watercourses Convention precisely because they are both based on
universal values.78
What is consistent throughout the Islamic principles relating to water
is that there is an obligation to respect watercourses as communal property
and to manage and protect them accordingly. Given the record of Daesh
seizure, control, and use of watercourses, Daesh control violates these
73

LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW, supra note 61, at 23.
Id.
See Naser I. Faruqui, Islam and Water Management: Overview and Principles, in WATER
MANAGEMENT IN ISLAM 1, 2 (Naser I. Faruqui et al., 2001) (quoting SUNAN ABU DAWOOD, bk. 23, no.
3470).
76
Wickström, supra note 64, at 100.
77
Faruqui, supra note 75, at 5 (quoting SUNAN AL-TIRMIDHI, bk. 2, no. 427).
78
Wickström, supra note 64, at 104.
74
75
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principles of Islamic Law as prescribed in the Qur’an and hadith literature.
Moreover, Daesh control of watercourses and related installations essentially
transforms them from a communal resource to exclusive property.
Daesh has repeatedly claimed it is acting in accordance with God’s
law. In its captured territories it has installed “religious police” that are
responsible for enforcing its interpretation of Sharia Law. Under its
interpretation, violations include not praying five times a day and women
wearing incomplete veils. 79 Such violations are punishable in a variety of
ways, from confiscation of valuables to capital punishment through
beheading, stoning, and hanging. Daesh provides non-Muslims in these
territories a grim ultimatum: convert or die. 80 Daesh has used the media and
Internet propaganda to publicize its religious interpretations and showcase
its enforcement.
Daesh extends its punishment and reward system to their control of
dams along the Tigris and Euphrates. The group has cut off or reduced
water flow to uncooperative towns and villages downstream from its
strongholds. Conversely, those that comply with their authority are provided
with water and power. When compared to the actual foundations of Islamic
Law, Daesh is in clear violation. It is important to understand the inherent
hypocrisy of their “Islamic” mission with respect to water rights.
C.

Obligations for State Actors to Protect Watercourses Under
International Law

The U.N. Watercourses Convention is the primary source of
international law related to water. Both Syria and Iraq are party to the
Convention. The U.N. General Assembly adopted the UNWC on May 21,
1997 and it entered into force on August 17, 2014.81
First, this section will examine how the UNWC became the primary
source pertaining to international water law. Second, it will discuss the
obligations of state actors to protect the watercourses under Daesh control.
79
Justen Charters, Life Under ISIS Religious Police is Brutal and Merciless, INDEP. J. REV. (2015),
http://www.ijreview.com/2014/08/167051-life-isis-religious-police-brutal-merciless/.
80
Mohamed Ghilan, The Consequences of Not Challenging the Islamic State, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 2,
2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/08/islamic-state-iraq-minorities-201481142447518
72.html.
81
United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses (as of Feb. 20, 1015), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-12&chapter=27&lang=en [hereinafter Status of the UNWC].
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Specifically, under Article 7, states must prevent significant harm to
watercourses; under Article 26, states must protect watercourse installations
in particular; and under Article 27, in the instance of an “emergency
situation,” states must take all measures to protect the watercourse
installations and mitigate the harmful effects of the emergency. Third, this
section will show how Article 29 of the UNWC incorporates International
Humanitarian Law in times of armed conflict, and how Articles 14 and 15 of
Protocol II of the Geneva Convention also apply to the ongoing Daesh
conflict.
1.

History of the U.N. Watercourses Convention

On May 21, 1997, more than one hundred U.N. Member States voted
to approve the U.N. Watercourses Convention. 82 The General Assembly
laid the groundwork for the UNWC in 1970, with a resolution tasking the
International Law Commission (ILC) to study the law applicable to
international watercourses. 83 The express goal of the resolution was to
create a governing system for international water management that would
supersede the fragmented system of bilateral treaties and regional
regulations under which water management was “based in part on general
principles of customary international law.”84 The ILC drafted the UNWC
over a period of nearly thirty years, during which it considered comments
from a large number of nations.85 The final draft of the UNWC passed by
the General Assembly in 1997 codifies many customary international water
law practices.
The U.N. Watercourses Convention required thirty-five states to ratify,
accept, or accede in order to be entered into force.86 Seventeen years after it
was passed by the General Assembly, the UNWC entered into force in
82
The goal of the convention was to provide a “framework for the utilization, development,
conservation, and protection of international watercourses, whilst promoting optimal and sustainable
utilization thereof for present and future generations, and accounting for the special situation and needs of
developing countries.” Frequently Asked Questions, U.N. WATERCOURSES CONVENTION: ONLINE USER’S
GUIDE, http://www. unwatercoursesconvention.org/faqs/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) [hereinafter FAQs,
U.N. WATERCOURSE CONVENTION]. See also G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/51/869, Preamble (Apr. 11, 1997) [hereinafter UNWC].
83
G.A. Res. 2669 (XXV) (Dec. 8, 1970).
84
Id. Frederick Lorenz has identified the fundamental principles of customary law applicable to
protection of water facilities in-depth as “those of humanity, discrimination, proportionality, and military
necessity.” Lorenz, supra note 21, at 11.
85
FAQs, U.N. WATERCOURSE CONVENTION, supra note 82.
86
UNWC, supra note 82, art. 36, § 1.
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2014. 87 Under international law, a treaty, once entered into force, becomes
enforceable amongst its signatories. 88
Iraq acceded to the U.N.
89
Watercourses Convention on July 9, 2001. Per Article 110, Eighth of the
Iraqi Constitution, the Iraqi federal government must plan policies relating to
water sources in accordance with international laws and conventions. 90
Thus, Article 110, Eighth gives deference to the UNWC. Syria was one of
the original signatories of the U.N. Watercourses Convention on August 11,
1997. 91 On April 2, 1998, Syria ratified the UNWC with a reservation that
doing so “sh[ould] not under any circumstances be taken to imply
recognition of Israel and sh[ould] not lead to its entering into relations
therewith that are governed by its provisions.” 92
Both Syria and Iraq were early signatories to the UNWC because of
Article 7 of the Convention, which establishes the obligation not to cause
significant harm. This requires that states “take all appropriate measures to
prevent the causing of significant harm” to other states sharing an
international watercourse. Because the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates
rise in Turkey, the downstream countries (both Iraq and Syria) are heavily
dependent on the resource.93 This provision could potentially aid Iraq and
Syria in establishing long-term water rights and challenging Turkey’s use—
or excessive use that causes significant harm—of the rivers.94 Article 7 is
broad enough to cover activities occurring within the signatory states, a
matter covered later in this section.
The UNWC defines “watercourses” as “a system of surface waters
and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a
unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus.” 95
Accordingly, “international watercourses” are watercourses as defined above,
parts of which are situated in different states.96 The Tigris and Euphrates
87
For further discussion on the delayed process of the UNWC entering into force, see Alistair RieuClarke & Flavia Loures, Still Not in Force: Should States Support the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention?,
18 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 185, 185–97 (2009).
88
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 24, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
89
Status of the UNWC, supra note 81.
90
Article 110, Section 8, 'XVWǌU -XPতǌUƯ\DW DO-ދ,UƗT [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of
2005.
91
Status of the UNWC, supra note 81.
92
Id.
93
LORENZ & ERICKSON, supra note 5, at 4–5.
94
Id. at 11–12.
95
UNWC, supra note 82, art. 2(a).
96
Id. art. 2(b).
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rivers are “international watercourses” as defined by the UNWC since they
constitute a unitary whole and flow into the common terminus of the Persian
Gulf through the multiple states of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Consequently,
the UNWC applies to all installations on both international watercourses,
including the Badush, Mosul, and Samarra Barrage Dams on the Tigris and
the Baath, Fallujah Barrage, Haditha, and Tabqa dams on the Euphrates.
The UNWC contains elements relating to human rights law. Article
10 identifies access to water as a “vital human need.”97 Indeed the UNWC
was the first water-related agreement to include this term, which has been
defined as “sufficient water to sustain human life, including both drinking
water and water required for the production of food in order to prevent
starvation.”98 In recognizing the human right to water, the UNWC creates
state obligations towards individuals to prioritize this right in all dealings.99
The UNWC, particularly Articles 7, 26, 28, and 29, provides a
framework that can be applied to Daesh control of installations on the
international watercourses.100 Articles 7, 26, and 28 list the obligations for
state parties to protect and maintain watercourses and related installations
from harmful human conduct at all times. Article 29 stipulates that the laws
of armed conflict apply in a period of armed conflict.
2.

State Obligations to Protect Watercourses Under Articles 7, 26, and
28

The UNWC has a broad ecological focus and most of the protections
are designed to maintain the sustainability of watercourses. However, three
Articles specifically create the obligation for states to protect watercourses
against harmful human conduct: Article 7, Article 26, and Article 28.
Article 7 creates the obligation to do no significant harm, assuring that
watercourse states shall “take all appropriate measures to prevent the
causing of significant harm” to the watercourse in their territories. 101
97

UNWC, supra note 82, art. 10 (“In the event of a conflict between uses of an international
watercourse, it shall be resolved with reference to Articles 5 and 7, with special regard being given to the
requirements of vital human needs.”).
98
Alistair Rieu-Clarke, Ruby Moynihan, & Bjørn-Oliver Magsig, U.N. Watercourses Convention
User’s Guide 129 (2012), http://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org.
99
Id. at 130 (“By using the term ‘special regard’ in Article 10 (2) it has to be presumed that water to
meet vital human needs will almost certainly take precedence over other uses.”).
100
UNWC, supra note 82, arts. 7, 26, 28, 29.
101
Id. art. 7, § 1
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Actions that would cross the threshold of “significant harm” include harm to
human health or safety. 102 The “do no harm” provision of Article 7 creates a
broad state obligation of due diligence in utilization, specifically to the
standard of a reasonable government in a similar circumstance. 103 Under
this standard, a state will breach its obligation to “do no harm” not only if it
causes the harmful event itself, but also if it does not take reasonable steps to
prevent others in its territory from causing it. 104 Here, the UNWC creates an
affirmative obligation for Syria, Iraq, and all other watercourse nations to
prevent significant harm to watercourses in their territory. 105 Harm to
watercourses and human safety have been demonstrated outcomes of Daesh
control of watercourse installations and can be further anticipated as possible
effects of future Daesh control.106
Article 26 creates the state duty of care for all installations related to
an international watercourse. 107 The ILC definition of installations includes
dams, barrages, dykes, and weirs. 108 The provision mandates that all
watercourse states shall “employ their best efforts to maintain and protect”
such installations. 109 The obligation to employ a state’s “best effort”
requires a state to perform due diligence that a dam is kept in good order
such that it will not burst and cause significant harm to other watercourse
states. 110 The ILC further states, “all reasonable precautions should be taken
to protect such works from foreseeable kinds of damage due to . . . human
acts, whether willful or negligent.” 111 A willful human act would include
terrorism and sabotage. 112 Article 26’s duty of care for installations applies
directly to Daesh threat of control of installations along the Tigris and
102

RIEU-CLARKE ET AL., supra note 98, at 117.
Id. at 119.
104
The ILC clarified this point in a commentary it adopted with the proposed resolution. See Draft
Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses and Commentaries
Thereto and Resolution on Transboundary Confined Groundwater, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 1994 89, 103,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l [hereinafter UNWC Commentary].
105
The scale of obligation between Iraq and Syria is different, as the latter one is still the mid-stream
riparian state, and has more obligations not to cause significant harm for Iraq, while Iraq is the last
downstream riparian state, which entails fewer obligations towards Syria and Turkey, but rather to ensure
its internal water is protected.
106
Church, supra note 3, at 11–12. See infra Part IV, “Potential Outcomes: Daesh Control of
Watercourses.”
107
UNWC, supra note 82, art. 26, § 1.
108
UNWC Commentary, supra note 104, at 127.
109
UNWC, supra note 82, art. 26, § 1.
110
UNWC Commentary, supra note 104, at 103.
111
Id. at 127.
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Euphrates, creating an obligation for Iraq and Syria to employ their best
efforts to maintain and protect the installations within their respective
territories.
Article 28 deals with the responsibility of states when an emergency
situation occurs. 113 Under the article, an emergency is “a situation that
causes, or poses an imminent threat of causing, serious harm to watercourse
States or other States” and can be created by human conduct.114 While this
provision was generally aimed at human-created emergencies such as
“industrial accidents,” the statutory language leaves the category broad
enough that seizure by an armed militant group could create an “emergency”
situation.115 The relevant obligations established by Article 28 maintain that
once a state is aware of an emergency, it must notify other potentiallyaffected states and “competent international organizations” and “take all
practical measures necessitated by the circumstances to prevent, mitigate,
and eliminate harmful effects of the emergency.” 116 The provision here
foresees the possibility that the emergency-affected state may need to
cooperate their response with a competent international organization “such
as a joint commission,” that might be better suited to deal with the
emergency. 117 Daesh’s human conduct poses an imminent threat of causing
serious harm to the watercourse states of Iraq and Syria and is therefore an
“emergency” as defined by Article 28. Even without the notification step,
both states are required to coordinate their response with other affected
states and international organizations.
3.

State Obligations Under International Humanitarian Law

Article 29 of the UNWC reads: “international watercourses and
related installations, facilities and other works shall enjoy the protection
accorded by the principles and rules of international law applicable in
international and non-international armed conflict and shall not be used in
violation of those principles and rules.” 118 The article does not create a new
rule. Instead, it binds states to the outside sources of international law for
internal armed conflict, including those that involve international
113
114
115
116
117
118

UNWC, supra note 82, art. 28.
Id.
Id. art. 28, § 1
Id. art. 28, §§ 2–3.
UNWC Commentary, supra note 104, at 130.
UNWC, supra note 82, art. 29, §§ 2–3.
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watercourses. 119 Effectively, in addition to the relevant provisions
previously discussed, Article 29 introduces the binding external treaties of
International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In other words, while the UNWC is
not an IHL treaty, it invokes the IHL provisions that would apply to
watercourses. Article 29 aims to clarify and strengthen the guidelines for the
protection of watercourses and facilities from existing legal obligations and
state practice.120
Under Article 29, states are obligated to protect watercourses under
the Convention during times of armed conflict. Furthermore, if affected by
the conflict the rules and principles of international law governing
international and non-international armed conflict also apply. 121 For the
purposes of Article 29, an “armed conflict” is a “protracted armed
confrontation” which takes place in a contracting state between “its armed
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which,
under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory
as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operation.”122
Article 29 fails to list precisely which public international law external
to the UNWC would apply to the protection of watercourses during armed
conflict. The 2012 User’s Guide to the UNWC (User’s Guide) provides a
useful tool to interpret which IHL would apply in tandem with the UNWC
provisions in times of armed conflict. 123 The User’s Guide states that in the
event of “armed conflict between the State and one or several non-State
actors” the applicable IHL would be the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and the Protocol relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 1977. 124
The relevant sections of Protocol II that apply in the present instance are
Articles 14 and 15. Article 14 of Protocol II prohibits the attack of any
119

UNWC Commentary, supra note 104, at 131.
This approach is similar to the one advocated by Frederick Lorenz, who drew from existing
international legal obligations and from state practice to create the “Draft Guidelines for Military Manuals
and Instructions on the Protection of Water Facilities in Times of Armed Conflict.” Lorenz, supra note 21,
at 37–38.
121
UNWC Commentary, supra note 104, at 131.
122
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in
International Humanitarian Law?, ICRC Opinion Paper (Mar. 3, 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/
resources/documents/article/other/armed-conflict-article-170308.html. See also Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts art. 1, ¶ 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.T.N.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
123
See generally RIEU-CLARKE ET AL., supra note 98.
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Id. at 218 (Figure 6.2).
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object indispensable to the survival of a civilian population in armed conflict,
including “drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.”125
Article 15 protects works and installations containing dangerous forces,
singling out that dams and dykes “shall not be made the object of attack,
even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause
the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the
civilian population.”126
In addition, a non-binding relevant source of international law comes
from the Berlin Rules on Water Resources resolution adopted by the ILA
Conference in 2004 (Berlin Rules).127 Article 52 of the Berlin Rules calls on
combatants during armed conflict to not “destroy or divert waters, or destroy
water installations, when such acts would cause widespread, long-term, and
severe ecological damage prejudicial to the health or survival of the
population of if such acts would fundamentally impair the ecological
integrity of waters.” 128
The instruments of IHL “point to the universal acceptance of certain
legally binding rules prohibiting hostile activities against or using water
resources and installations as a weapon.” 129 This assessment indicates a
strong argument under which Daesh can be held in clear violation of
international law. Understanding the legal framework of Daesh’s liability is
essential if the international community seeks accountability in the long term.
III.

OBLIGATIONS OF DAESH AS AN ARMED NON-STATE ACTOR IN AN
ARMED CONFLICT

There is a debate in international law as to what extent ANSAs such
as Daesh are bound by International Humanitarian Law, such as Protocol II,
and international law, such as the UNWC. 130 This is an important issue
125
Protocol II, supra note 122, art. 14. Frederick Lorenz emphasizes those Protocol II protections to
water installations “does not apply to situations outside armed conflict, including terrorism.” Lorenz, supra
note 21, at 15. The argument for Daesh satisfying the requirements for “armed conflict” above mere
“terrorism” will be examined in Part III.
126
Protocol II, supra note 122, art. 16.
127
RIEU-CLARKE ET AL., supra note 98, at 219.
128
Berlin Conference, International Law Association’s Fourth Report Water Resources Law, 44
(2004), http://internationalwaterlaw.org/documents /intldocs/ILA_Berlin_Rules-2004.pdf.
129
Patricia Wouters, Sergei Vinogradov, & Bjørn-Oliver Magsig, Water Security, Hydrosolidarity,
and International Law: A River Runs Through It, 19 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 97, 126 (2009).
130
Lorenz, supra note 21, at 18 (“International law was originally directed at state action; historically
states have been the principal players on the international stage. But in recent years there has been
increasing emphasis on individual (criminal) responsibility.”).
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because modern conflict is increasingly characterized as “noninternational”—lacking two or more state actors—and involving at least one
ANSA. The growing consensus among international legal scholars is that
non-state actors are subject to international law.131
This Part will analyze under which circumstances ANSAs are subject
to IHL and international law. First, ANSAs are legally obliged by
instruments of IHL, such as Protocol II, provided they meet the specific
criteria of participating in an armed conflict, containing a developed
organizational structure, and controlling territory. Second, there are several
theoretical frameworks that use the foundation for IHL obligations to argue
that ANSAs should be held to the broader body of treaty law. This Part will
examine how Daesh might be accountable to the UNWC under the theory of
de facto control of a population and other state-like functions.
A.

ANSA Obligations Under International Humanitarian Law

An ANSA is bound by IHL if there is an armed conflict as defined by
IHL, the group possesses a sufficiently developed structure, and the group
has control of territory. 132 Under these criteria, Protocol II has been applied
to non-state actors in Russia, Colombia, El Salvador, and Rwanda. 133 Daesh
operations in both Syria and Iraq fulfill these three requirements; Daesh is
therefore covered under IHL.
First, an armed conflict of non-international character is defined in
Common Article 3 to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions as armed conflict
that occurs “in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” 134
There are no express minimum requirements as to the duration of the
conflict or the intensity of the violence to be deemed an armed conflict.135
IHL expert Frederick Lorenz argues that “the term ‘armed conflict’ does not
131
See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT (Andrew
Clapham & Paolo Gaeta eds., 2014).
132
Bellal & Casey-Maslen, Enhancing Compliance, supra note 20, at 179. Criteria listed in Protocol
II applies to “all armed conflicts . . . which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between
its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.” Protocol II, supra note 122, art. 1(1).
133
Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations, 88 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 491, 510 (2011).
134
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135.
135
Bellal & Casey-Maslen, Enhancing Compliance, supra note 20, at 180.
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include isolated attacks on water installations from terrorist groups,” and
furthermore “international humanitarian law was not designed to cover
terrorism or short-term criminal activity.” 136 In the present case of Daesh,
the criteria of non-international armed conflict has been satisfied in both
Syria and Iraq. Daesh has a sophisticated strategy of “clear and hold”
wherein it has engaged in explicit armed conflict in the territories of both
Iraq and Syria. 137 Daesh’s methodology suggests they operate less in the
mode of “isolated attacks” traditionally attributed to “terrorist groups”
identified by Lorenz as outside the scope of IHL. Therefore, Daesh fulfills
the first requirement of engaging in armed conflict.
Second, a group must possess a sufficiently developed command
structure in order for IHL to apply. Case law generated from the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia establishes that a
“sufficiently developed structure” may be indicated by “the existence of a
command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the group;
the existence of a headquarters; its ability to plan, coordinate, and carry out
military operations, including troop movements and logistics.” 138 To that
point, Daesh has a well-defined structure of government under the Caliph
Abu Bakr al-Baghadadi, including the deputy of Iraq Abu Muslim alTurkmani and deputy of Syria Abu Ali al-Anbari, both of whom oversee
twelve governors and councils on intelligence, finance, and law, among
many others. 139 Daesh therefore satisfies the second requirement of
possessing a sufficiently developed control structure.
Protocol II creates the most stringent requirement. Namely, in order
to bind an ANSA, such group must have “control of territory.” 140 There is
disagreement over the amount of territory that an ANSA must control to
fulfill this requirement. 141 A commentary published by the International
136
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Committee of the Red Cross claims that partial control triggers the Protocol
II “territory” obligation as long as there is some degree of stability in that
control.142 Daesh has renamed the territory it has controlled through military
force as a new “Islamic State” which it has defined outside of the traditional
state borders. As of December 2015, Daesh controls large swaths of
territory in Syria and Iraq along the Tigris and Euphrates watercourses.143
The large amount of land that Daesh has “claimed” and maintained control
over satisfies any reading of Protocol II’s requirement of an ANSA to have
“control of territory.”
B.

ANSA Obligations Under International Law

While it is well established that ANSAs are accountable to the
obligations of IHL if they meet the three criteria outlined in Protocol II, a
more contentious question is whether they are held to similar obligations
under treaty law more broadly. Some scholars have argued that ANSAs fall
outside of the scope of state-created treaties as they are “neither intended,
nor adequate, to govern armed conflict between the state and armed
opposition groups.” 144 Treaties in general do not explicitly list non-state
actors as applicable parties. 145 There are recent exceptions to this general
rule in which non-state actors are explicitly bound in treaty text. However,
the UNWC is not one such exception.146
Other scholars have argued that ANSAs are subjects under treaties
and inherit the obligations created by treaties. Andrew Clapham, an
influential scholar on international human rights, has noted that when
treaties contain provisions to protect human rights, such as Article 10 of the
UNWC, it is essential that ANSAs are bound. He argues that the strongest
basis for applying human rights obligations to ANSAs is that “the
foundational basis of human rights is best explained as rights which belong
142
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to the individual in recognition of each person’s inherent dignity. The
implication is that these natural rights should be respected by everyone and
every entity.” 147
The most prominent argument for Daesh adherence to the broad body
of international law is that ANSAs can be held accountable under the theory
of performing de facto governmental functions over a population. In other
words, treaty obligations apply to ANSAs when they “exercise elements of
governmental functions and have de facto authority over a population.”148
The thrust behind the argument is that a chief purpose of human rights
provisions such as Article 10 of the UNWC is to protect the people governed
from the people governing them. Therefore, if a non-state actor assumes the
functions of governance, it should be held to the same standards.149
This criterion for applying international law is in many ways a parallel
application of the requirements for applying IHL to ANSAs through
Protocol II.150 Indeed, a 2006 UN report filed on Lebanon and Israel by a
group of four special rapporteurs argued that ANSAs, in this instance
Hezbollah, assumed international obligations to respect human rights when
the group “exercises significant control over territory and population and has
an identifiable political structure.” 151 In other words, if an ANSA acts like a
state, in so much as it has an internal political structure and controls territory,
it should be held to the same obligations as a state.
Daesh fulfills the requirements of acting like a state by exercising de
facto authority over populations in both Syria and Iraq. Under the leadership
of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi since 2013, Daesh has strategically gained large
swaths of territory surrounding the Tigris and Euphrates watercourses. 152 In
the territories they have conquered, Daesh has governed Iraqis and Syrians
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with punishment and reward systems, forcing people into submission or
forcing people to leave. 153
Daesh has express aspirations to represent a state encompassing more
than an armed group, as exhibited by their call for Muslims to perform a
global hijrah (religious migration) to join their new state with their family
members. 154 Furthermore, as discussed in the previous Part, Daesh has a
sophisticated internal political structure, complete with regional governors
who oversee councils for finance, leadership, military, legal, intelligence,
and media.155 In all territories over which Daesh has seized control, they
exercise de facto authority of the population with their own internal structure,
thus satisfying the theoretical framework that would obligate them to respect
human rights law and the relevant provisions of the UNWC.
The fundamental roadblock to using this framework to hold ANSAs
as subjects to international law is that it requires states to acknowledge the
legitimacy of the ANSAs’ authority over a population. As Andrew Clapham
writes, “it is well-known that neither governments nor international
organizations will readily admit that rebels are operating in ways which are
akin to governments.” 156 Indeed, to bind Daesh under this framework would
necessitate that Iraq, Syria, and the international community at large
acknowledge that Daesh has assumed governmental functions in the areas in
which it maintains territorial control. States are unlikely to recognize Daesh
as a legal state because recognition could serve to legitimize its operation.
And at the time of this writing, no state has indicated any interest in
recognizing Daesh as a state.157
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APPLICATION OF LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO CASES OF DAESH CONTROL

This Part is designed to reiterate the legal obligations under domestic,
Islamic, and international law triggered by Daesh control of watercourse
installations. First, the Part will analyze Daesh control of the Fallujah Dam
in Iraq. Second, it will analyze Daesh control of the Tabqa Dam in Syria.
Third, it will consider the difficulties in implementing these obligations and
potential systems of implementation.
A.

Daesh Control of Fallujah Dam

In April 2014, Daesh seized control of the Fallujah dam in Iraq. Once
they had control, Daesh immediately shut down dam operations depriving
millions of people in downstream Shiite cities Karbala and Najaf of water
access.158 Within a week, Daesh suddenly reopened five of the ten barrage
gates. 159 The effect destroyed 160 kilometers of downstream cropland.160
The intent behind the water release was to “use water aggressively as a tool
of destruction, targeting populations who live farther south.”161
Under Iraqi Law, per Article 7, Second, the state has a general
obligation to protect its territories from becoming a base, pathway, or field
for terrorist activities. 162 Furthermore, under Article 110, the federal
government has the obligation to guarantee the rate of water flow and its just
distribution inside Iraq. 163 The obligation to guarantee a “just distribution”
is furthered by Article 114, Seventh, as a shared duty of federal and regional
authorities. Daesh control of the Fallujah Dam triggers all of these
obligations for the Iraqi government to “protect” the territory from Daesh
erratic distribution of the water.
Under Islamic Law, which Iraqi law must comply with under Article 2,
First, water is to remain a public resource. 164 Qur’anic scripture regards
water as a common property and makes protection and regulation of
watercourses central requests. 165 Hadith literature obligates Muslims to
158
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160
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maintain a common share of water and to not waste water even if on the
bank of a large river. 166 Daesh violated these tenants of Islamic Law by
cutting off water to the downstream cities of Karbala and Najaf.
Furthermore, by subsequently flooding and destroying 160 kilometers of
cropland, it again violated the tenet to use water responsibly. Under these
tenets, the Iraqi state possesses the obligation to keep the Fallujah Dam
managed in a way that maintains universal access.
Under Articles 7, 26, and 28 of the UNWC, to which Iraq has acceded,
the state has the duty to protect the watercourses. Under Article 7, Iraq has
the obligation to prevent significant harm to watercourses. Under Article 26,
Iraq has the obligation to employ its best efforts to maintain and protect
watercourse installations such as the Fallujah Dam. Under Article 28, in the
event of a emergency situation created by human conduct, Iraq has the
obligation to notify competent international organizations and take all
practical measures to eliminate the harmful effects created by the emergency.
Daesh control of the Fallujah Dam triggers all these UNWC articles. From a
theoretical perspective, Daesh is accountable under these articles as a result
of exercising de facto authority over the territory.
Under IHL, incorporated by Article 29 of the UNWC, both Iraq and
Daesh have an obligation to prevent damage to the installation in the course
of armed conflict. Under Protocol II, Articles 14 and 15 guarantee the
universal right to water and prohibit the attack of watercourse installations.
Protocol II obligates Iraq II to prevent Daesh attacks in order to preserve the
infrastructure. Daesh satisfies the three requirements to be bound by IHL—
participating in an armed conflict, possessing a developed structure, and
controlling territory. Therefore, Daesh control of the Fallujah Dam violates
Protocol II.
B.

Daesh Control of Tabqa Dam

Early in 2013, Daesh captured the Tabqa Dam. The Euphrates’
installation is a source of water and electricity for five million people,
including residents of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city. 167 Under Daesh control,
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the Tabqa’s reservoir Lake Assad was dramatically emptied, causing
blackouts in Aleppo for an average of sixteen to twenty hours a day. 168
Under the Mejelle, the French Mandate, and Act No. 31 of Syrian
Law, the government has an obligation to prevent Daesh control of the
Tabqa Dam. Under the Mejelle, water is forbidden from becoming the
absolute property of any person. 169 Under the French Mandate,
watercourses are to remain alienable and imprescriptible. 170 Act No. 31
mandates that watercourses are a public good and are to remain protected
from depletion.171 Therefore, Syria has the obligation to prevent Daesh from
depleting the Lake Assad reservoir and assuring that the Tabqa Dam remains
a public good. The Syrian Constitution, specifically the Introduction and
Article 114, obligates the state to maintain peace and prevent any force that
threatens general safety.
Under Islamic Law, with which Syrian law must comply under Article
2 of the constitution, water is to remain a public resource. 172 Qur’anic
scripture regards water as a common property and makes protection and
regulation of watercourses central requests. 173 Hadith literature obligates
Muslims to maintain a common share of water and to not waste water even
if on the bank of a large river. 174 Daesh violated these tenants of Islamic
Law by depleting the Lake Assad reservoir behind the Tabqa Dam. The
Syrian state under these tenants possesses the obligation to keep the Tabqa
Dam managed in a way that maintains universal access.
Under Articles 7, 26, and 28 of the UNWC, which Syria has ratified,
the state has the duty to protect the watercourses. Under Article 7, Syria has
the obligation to prevent significant harm to watercourses. Under Article 26,
Syria has the obligation to employ their best efforts to maintain and protect
watercourse installations such as the Tabqa Dam. Article 28 obligates Syria
to, in the event of an emergency situation created by human conduct, notify
competent international organizations and take all practical measure to
eliminate the harmful effects created by the emergency. Daesh control of
the Tabqa Dam triggers all of these articles. From a theoretical perspective,
168
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Daesh will be accountable to respect these articles when exercising de facto
authority over the territory.
Under International Humanitarian Law, incorporated through Article
29 of the UNWC, both Syria and Daesh have an obligation to prevent
damage to the installation in the course of armed conflict. Articles 14 and
15 of Protocol II guarantee the universal right to water and prohibit the
attack of watercourse installations. Protocol II obligates Syria to prevent
Daesh attacks in order to preserve the infrastructure. Daesh satisfies each of
the three requirements necessary to be bound by IHL; it participates in an
armed conflict, possesses a developed structure, and controls territory. As
such, Daesh control of the Tabqa Dam violates Protocol II.
C.

Mechanisms of Enforcement

The ability to hold Daesh accountable from a legal perspective will
not be easily achievable. Indeed, during the twentieth century, the world
saw the “massive victimization of innocent people,” much of which “could
be described as a clear violation of international humanitarian law.” 175
However, in “most cases the perpetrators of these crimes have not been held
accountable for their actions.” 176
A potential long-term strategy for holding Daesh accountable for
numerous violations of international and domestic law is the creation of a
special tribunal. One starting point for developing a Daesh Tribunal is the
principles proposed in the “Chautauqua Blueprint for a Statute for a Syrian
Extraordinary Tribunal to Prosecute Atrocity Crimes” (Chautauqua
Blueprint).177 Chief prosecutors of various international criminal tribunals
developed the proposed Tribunal in the Chautauqua Blueprint. 178 The
Chautauqua Blueprint calls for a domestic Tribunal, with international
elements: “It would be complementary to the ordinary criminal and military
courts of Syria, which would prosecute lower level perpetrators, and to an
international tribunal if one were to be established or given jurisdiction to
prosecute the highest level perpetrators.” 179 The same concerns considered
175
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by the drafters of Chautauqua Blueprint are present in Daesh situation.180 As
such, the intricacies of incorporating international elements in the domestic
contexts of both Iraq and Syria should be duplicated for a potential special
Daesh Tribunal.
A short-term strategy to hold Daesh accountable may be best achieved
outside of the legal context. A potentially successful strategy for NGOs and
other concerned actors would be to advertise the numerous violations of law
that Daesh has committed. As much of the initial success of Daesh has been
based on media and Internet propaganda, this could be a useful counterstrategy for the U.S. and its allies. It might hinder Daesh recruitment efforts
and showcase the inherent hypocrisy of their “Islamic” mission.
Furthermore, now that it has come into force, publicizing Daesh’s violations
of the rights guaranteed in detail by the UN Watercourses Convention
should also be an effective tool to help coordinate the international
intervention and protect Syrian and Iraqi watercourses. The water security
element should not be neglected in a comprehensive strategy to deal with
Daesh.
V.

CONCLUSION

State actors have clear legal obligations to prevent Daesh control of
watercourse installations. There are explicit obligations created under Iraqi
law, Syrian law, and Islamic Law to protect universal access to installations
along the watercourses of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Under international
law, the UN Watercourses Convention obligates states to protect
watercourses generally. Under International Humanitarian Law, Protocol II
and customary international law create obligations to protect water
installations in times of armed conflict.
Although these state obligations exist, the likelihood that Syria and
Iraq will fulfill their obligations in the short term is doubtful. With regards
to Daesh, its only obligation as an ANSA arises under the IHL requirements
of Protocol II and customary international law. Although we may identify
some emerging trends in customary international law, this potentially may
be the first instance of ANSA control of extensive territory and watercourses.
Thus, the process to hold Daesh accountable will be very slow. Daesh is in
180
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direct violation of the UNWC, but under the current model of international
law, any application of the legal framework to these violations is purely
theoretical. Daesh control of watercourse installations violates domestic law
in both Syria and Iraq, as well as several provisions of Islamic Law.
International law has historically viewed states as the only relevant
actors in times of peace and conflict. In this positivist system, states are the
only actors that can consent to principles of law. As such, states are the
primary obligation holders. Experiences in recent decades reveal that this
assumption fails to capture the political reality that non-state actors are
relevant and harmful actors on the international stage. By failing to
acknowledge non-state actors as legal actors, the international law
framework has failed to consistently hold non-state actors accountable for
human rights violations. The gap between reality and the law has perhaps
never been more visible than in the context of Daesh. International law must
develop the necessary nuances to hold Daesh, and similar actors,
accountable for their flagrant violations. This change is vital not only for the
legitimacy of the larger system, but also for the individual lives hurt most by
the lack of accountability.

